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ABSTRACT 
The EU FP 7 project ‘SOCIOEC’ started in March 2012 and this paper gives an overview on the main research 
questions and first results.  
SOCIOEC is an interdisciplinary project bringing together scientists from several fisheries sciences with industry 
partners  and  other  key  stakeholders  to  work  on  solutions  for  future  fisheries  management  that  can  be 
implemented at a regional level. The first step will be to develop a coherent and consistent set of management 
objectives, which will address ecological; economic and social sustainability targets. The objectives should be 
consistent with the aims of the CFP, MSFD and other EU directives, but they should also be understandable by 
the wider stakeholder community and engage their support. This will then lead to the proposal of a number of 
potential management measures, based on existing or new approaches. The second step will be to analyze the 
incentives for compliance provided by these measures examining fisher’s responses and perceptions based on 
historical analysis as well as direct consultation and interviews. This project part will also examine how the 
governance  can  be  changed  to  facilitate  self-  and  co-management  to  ensure  fishers  buy-in  to  promising 
management measures. Finally, the project will examine the impacts of the management measures that emerge 
from this process, particularly in terms of their economic and social impacts. The IA analysis will be integrated 
by evaluating the proposed measures against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency  and coherence. Special 
attention will be paid to the evaluation of the proposed management measures’ performance in terms of their 
ability to achieve the general and specific ecological objectives. 
Keywords: Socio economic impact assessment, SOCIOEC research project, EU fisheries policy 
Introduction 
The EU Commission issued a call for a project on the socio-economic effects of fisheries management measures 
of the revised CFP. The new CFP basic regulation should be in force from January 2013 but the process of 
adoption by EU Council and Parliament is delayed and the regulation will probably be adopted in June 2013. 
The  project  is  organised  in  seven  workpackages  to  answer  the  main  research  question  of  the  call:  overall 
objectives  of  the  CFP,  incentive  structure  of  management  measures,  better  governance  and  integration  of 
stakeholders and improvement of methods for socio-economic impact assessment. The paper gives, firstly, an 
overview on the project and describes the research plans for the four main work packages. Secondly, as the 
project just started, only the results of the first general discussion on economic sustainability objectives can be 
included. In a focus group discussion during a joint workshop with the MYFISH project possible objectives were 
identified  with Maximum Economic  Yield (MEY) appearing  most prominently, as it  is an objective in the 
Australian fisheries policy. The paper finishes with an outlook on the future research in the SOCIOEC project.   
Overview on the SOCIOEC-project 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is actually under revision. The EU-Commission published an analysis of 
the current basic regulation (EU 2371/2002) in 2009 and stated that there are still great structural problems in the 
implementation of a sustainable exploitation of fish stocks. The EU-Commission then published within the 7
th 
framework research program a call for a project to address some of these structural problems by analyzing the 
overarching objectives of the CFP (WP 2), the incentive structure in actual and future management measures 
(WP  3),  the  possible  governance  structure  for  a  better  integration  of  stakeholders  and  fishermen  in  the 
management  process  (WP  4)  and  improvement  of  the  methods  for  socio-economic  impact  assessment  of 
management measures (WP 5). The consortium set up the following project structure (see Fig. 1).  




Fig. 1: Overall structure of the SOCIOEC project 
The work has been organized along Case Studies which will follow a regional seas context (e.g. Baltic or North 
Sea) very similar to the defined areas of the Regional Advisory Councils (RAC). Within these areas several 
fisheries will be analysed with actual (blue) and possible future (red) management measures. Table 1 (see next 
page) gives an overview on the planned case studies and management measures.  
As Council and Parliament are still debating the new basic regulation it is at this point necessary to be flexible 
and possibly adjust the research program. It seems clear that at least for the discard ban we may have to adjust 
the research program a bit as the Council changed the COM proposal from a species to a fisheries approach. 
Discards  would  then  be  banned  first  in  pelagic  fisheries,  then  demersal  fisheries  and  from  2018  on  in  all 
fisheries. In the same way, it seems at this point that the EU wise ITQ system in the proposal will shift to a 
voluntary  scheme  to  be  decided  at  national  level.  This  would  also  require  the  adaptation  of  the  research 
programme,  for  example  with  respect  to  governance  issues  as  the  focus  shifts  now  towards  national 
governments. 
Overarching principles of the CFP 
In general there is a broad agreement that a sustainable exploitation of resources has to be the central premise of 
future fisheries management [1]. Sustainable development has then been defined by the UN (Brundtland-Report 
‘Our Common Future’ ([2]) as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm). Sustainability 
can be considered in terms of the three pillars of sustainability developed by the UN at the 2002 Johannesburg 
Summit  and  elaborated  by  the  EU  in  terms  of  environmental,  economic  and  social  sustainability  (see  [3]). 
Therefore, the sustainability concept has strong ecological and ethical roots – without ignoring the necessities for 
exploitation (industry and well being of people, see [4]). Within WP 2 we will start with an analysis of the basic 
concepts  to  define  the  overarching  principles  of  sustainability  within  the  three  pillar  concept.  However,  as 
background we draw also on the sustainability debate within a socio-economic context.  
In the new field of sustainability economics two basic sustainability concepts are distinguished: weak and strong 
sustainability ([5]). The concept of weak sustainability is based on the work of Solow ([6]) on the substitutability 
of natural resources (especially non-renewable). If natural capital (NC, resources) are perfectly substitutable with 
man-made capital, then non-declining utility per capita over time can theoretically be maintained by a constant 
overall capital stock of a society and it doesn’t matter what capital (natural or man-made)
2 delivers the benefits. 
In the marine fishery context this would imply that reduction in stocks could be balanced by economic gain, 
regardless of other impacts e.g. on the ecosystem ([7]).The concept of strong sustainability assumes that there is 
limited substitutability between natural and man-made capital, and this leads to the obligation of preserving 
natural capital for future generations - according to the Constant Natural Capital Rule ([8]). Moreover, since 
natural capital is not homogeneous even the substitutability within the natural capital itself is limited ([9]). The 
limited substitutability of NC (basically fish stocks and the supporting ecosystems) is in fisheries almost a given, 
as  the  fishing  activity  itself  needs  a  fish  stock.  Moreover,  especially  in  fisheries  the  three  dimensions  of IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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sustainability  are  intimately  connected.  How  these  different  definitions  and  understandings  of  sustainability 
influence the outcome of the definition of clear objectives in fisheries management must be elaborated and the 
reference indicators and levels associated to this.  
Table 1: Overview on the planned analysis of management measures within the Case Study Areas (blue refers to 
current management measures while red refers to potential future measures) 
2 












Measures  Conservation  TAC             
    Catch quota             
    Effort regulation             
    Long-term plans             
    Technical measures             
    Over-quota landing tax 
3 
         
4 
  Access  IQ             
    ITQ             
    ITE             
    TURF               
  Others  MPAs             
    Certification             
    Subsidies             
Processes  Regionalisation    Partly 
Helcom 
         
  Co-management             
  Self-management             
Issues  Mixed fisheries 
5           
  Small scale fisheries           
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One of the main research activities of the project will be to develop a series of broad, generic objectives that 
encompass the three sustainability dimensions, and focus on their application in any future revision of the CFP. 
This  will  be  done,  firstly,  through  a  literature  review.  The  overview  from  the  literature  will  include  both 
conceptual studies and real-world experiences, including examples outside Europe. In  many cases the three 
objectives have been present in fisheries management policies for many years, both at EU (CFP) and national 
levels. Therefore, the review should also include an appraisal of how these objectives were addressed in the past, 
particularly in the CFP. The review should in particular identify failures, successes, and where possible their 
raison  d'être.  From  a  research  perspective,  the  analysis  of  objectives  considered  by  SOCIOEC  will  include 
examples covering a wide range of management approaches discussed in the project, as technical measures, 
command  and  control  instruments  (e.g.  quota  management),  market  instruments,  structural  programme 
instruments and social instruments.  
In April 2012 the FP 7 projects MYFISH and SOCIOEC had a common workshop with high level stakeholders 
(e.g. RAC representatives, NGOs on the European level) regarding the overarching principles of the CFP. The 
focus for MYFISH was more the longer term perspective on the main targets of fisheries management (beyond 
simply achieving MSY). For SOCIOEC the discussion was slightly more focused on how to interpret the actual 
principles in the CFP for ecological, social and economic sustainability. Following from that discussion, first 
results from the economic discussion will be presented later in this paper. The next step will be to organize 
focused  group  discussion  in  the  case  study  areas  to  fine-tune  the  overarching  principles  into  a  set  of 
targets/indicators  on  the  regional/company  level.  This  will  include  the  consideration  of  obstacles  to  the IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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implementation  of  sustainable  fisheries  management,  with  results  from  the  literature  review,  and  the 
development of a list of objectives that would be applicable more locally, but still comply with the overarching 
objectives. It is likely that there may need to be some adjustment of the overarching objectives subsequently, 
where for example, a synthesis of the regional responses indicate that an overarching objective has little or no 
currency at any regional level. With clearer objectives on the regional as well as the broader EU level, we will 
then interpret these objectives in the context of the individual case study fisheries, and present second level 
objectives that are consistent with those on the EU and regional level, and appropriate for the fishery in question. 
Incentives of existing and future management measures 
The EU Commission itself and many others have already analysed the structural failures and the problems of the 
current CFP ([10], [11], [12]). There is a general understanding that these structural failures have to do with 
wrong incentives leading to fishers’ behavioral responses which conflict with the aim of the CFP (encouraging 
sustainable exploitation of natural resources) and that stakeholder influence and involvement on a regional basis 
is not strong.
7 However, for some of the general perceptions concerning the wrong incentives we have relatively 
little  empirical  evidence  (e.g.  how  fishers  value  future  gains  and  losses  with  implicit  discount  rates). 
Additionally, we only have limited knowledge on fishers’ behavioural responses to certain frame conditions and 
incentives.  
We draw  here also on the  WP 2 discussion on  social  sustainability  as  the social background of  fishermen 
influences the incentive structure. The concept of sustainable development in a social context includes concepts 
such as employment, food security and worker safety among others, but can also include a cultural dimension. 
This can comprise the issues of ethical orientation and action-leading values, lifestyle debates, cultural diversity, 
traditional knowledge and skills, local and regional space of reasoning and acting, gender issues etc. ([13]). So, 
the  social  and  the  cultural  context  can  also  play  a  crucial  role  in  informing  fisheries  management.  This  is 
particularly the case with coastal, small-scale fisheries, in which locally rooted knowledge and traditional skills 
are  still  maintained  and  passed  on,  and  the  concept  of  a  sustainable  management  might  still  interact  with 
traditional values that we seek to maintain. In Canada, for example, fisheries management decisions include the 
spiritual role of salmon in first nation cultures. Moreover, the role of the fishing sector for coastal communities 
in a time of huge changes in societies, the positive effects on tourism, and generally on the local culture can play 
a significant role for regional development. Therefore from a management perspective the cultural perception of 
fishing as an activity needs to be taken into account when developing new or existing measures, as in many areas 
of Europe, fishing is concentrated in marginal areas where the local cultural ethos (as well as economic viability) 
is strongly linked to fishing. These aspects are clearly connected not only to social or cultural themes, but also to 
economic and ecological issues and will be given an outstanding consideration. 
The cultural and social dimensions for the local community will be examined with particular attention to gender 
issues  in  this  project.  As  a  working  hypothesis  to  be  verified,  one  can  plausibly  suggest  that  the  working 
conditions in the fisheries sector have led to a traditional division of labour (men out at sea, women working in 
the processing sector) due not only to the physically hard work but also to the problems of reconciling child care 
(mothering and more recently fathering) with the necessity of spending long periods or at least the whole week 
away from home. This might also explain the recently diminishing interest of the young generation (both men 
and women) in a career in the fisheries sector. Attempts to meet these needs and consider such impasses are 
currently being addressed ([14]). Competitive wages are also needed to attract new entrants into fishing, while 
decreaseing  job  opportunities  in  other  sectors  might  be  making  fisheries  more  attractive  in  certain  local 
communities.  
The incentive structure and associated behavioral responses of fishers will be analysed using several methods 
within the case study research design. Each case study follows the same line of thinking in order to be able to 
make generalizations that will serve for the management toolbox afterwards. Overall four methods will be used 
to assess the incentive structures behind fisheries management measures in a way that adapts to the qualitative 
differences  of  the  targeted  populations  and  also  to  the  available  resources  for  data  collection  and  contact 
stakeholder.  
The  first  method  is  the  collection  and  evaluation  of  existing  literature  in  the  area,  specifically  related  to 
incentives. Much research has already been done on incentives, and presenting different viewpoints/disciplines 
([15], [16], [17]) These interdisciplinary data that digs into the potential causes of the different performance of 
management measures will have our specific attention, as these were usually lacking in previous studies. We will 
review this research, use what is appropriate and add new elements to it as for example those referring to the 
specific evolution of the CFP and the challenges that are presented at the set out of any of our project case 
studies. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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The second basic method will consist of conducting interviews with fishers, complemented with interviews with 
people  surrounding  fishers,  such  as  crew  members,  relatives,  bank  employees,  etc.  who  possibly  influence 
fishers’ decisions. This method will be applied e.g. to the Irish component of the Western Waters fisheries in a 
first stage, and to other fisheries/CS wherever possible. The interviewing technique ([18], [19]) is used to collect 
qualitative data by setting up a situation (the interview) that allows a respondent the time and scope to talk about 
their opinions on a particular subject. It is a very simple, efficient and practical way of getting data about things 
that cannot be easily observed, quantified and that are complex, such as reasons behind behaviour. The interview 
questions will focus on incentives. We will give particular attention to technical measures (e.g. mesh sizes), 
command and control instruments (e.g. TACs and quotas, effort), market instruments (e.g. transferability of 
collective or individual rights), and social instruments in the way they influence fishers’ (compliance) behaviour. 
In addition to these instruments, we will also give attention to incentives created by non-instrumental factors, 
such as market factors (prices, certification, alternative employment), biological factors (fish stock abundance, 
availability, distribution, growth, recruitment, etc.), and social factors (peer pressure, succession  issues, and 
gender aspects). 
During the interviews we will also reserve time to use choice experiments (CE) to analyze which management 
measures and at what organization level, create the right incentives to tackle the main structural failings in one or 
more of the case study fisheries ([20] and [21]). In a CE framework, choices are broken down into component 
attributes, which are presented to respondents normally as a combination set of the attributes. Respondents are 
then presented with a sequence of these choice sets, each containing alternative descriptions of the fisheries 
management choices, differentiated by attributes and levels. Respondents are then asked to state their preferred 
alternative within the choice set ([22] and [19]). By observing and modelling how respondents change their 
preferred option in response to the changes in the levels of the attributes, it is possible to determine how fishers 
trade-off between the different management options. By including change in landings revenue or income as one 
of the attributes of each option, the monetary welfare impact of moving from the status quo fishing policy today 
to an alternative fishing policy with attribute levels set to be representative of what would result under alternative 
management strategies (representing perhaps in our case a change in CFP as represented by different levels of 
the management attributes) can be calculated. To date, no paper in the literature has considered the use of CEs 
based  on  the  theoretical  framework  of  random  utility  models,  to  examine  the  preferences  of  fishers  for 
alternative  management  options  in  their  respective  fisheries.  This  project  proposes  to  fill  this  gap  in  the 
literature.  
The third method will investigate the impact of various forms of rights-based management (RBM) on short-term 
fleet dynamics. The methodology will build on discrete-choice models (Random Utility Models, RUM), which 
have been widely used in the fisheries literature ([23], to evaluate the impact of closed areas ([24], [25]), and 
also of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQs) ([26]). This method will primarily build on Western Waters mixed 
fisheries, but the code developed will be made adequately generic to be applied to other case studies using the 
standard data exchange  format delivered by WP6 (integration and information  flow across case studies). A 
challenge here will be to apply this method, building on data-driven RUMs, to fisheries where RBM have not 
been implemented formally until now (the great majority of EU fisheries), as it is one of the aims of the project 
to analyse not only current management measures but also potentially useful ones. To overcome that challenge, 
we propose a dual approach. First, we will ask the participating Producer Organisation representatives to provide 
quantitative  information  on  the  catch  portfolios  allotted  to  their  members.  We  will  then  combine  these 
quantitative inputs with effort data given in log-books to calibrate discrete choice models. Because a risk exists 
that such data will not be available, a second approach will be to consider that the changes brought about by 
RBM  are  mainly  technical  and  information-related,  in  which  case  effort  allocation  could  in  principle  be 
estimated as a measure of polyvalence and mobility of fleets in the case study. 
As a fourth method we propose the game table approach "ecoOcean" see also [27]) basically for the Baltic and 
North Sea case study. This is a graphical interface presenting a cellular based projection of an ocean with fish 
stocks, where up to four players/users (representing different stakeholders) can navigate their vessels and trawls. 
The representation will be designed in a participatory manner, such that the user would agree on the general 
dynamics of stocks and of their exploitation. Different management measures, e.g. closed areas, TAC, ITQs, can 
be simulated to play through socially interacting groups with stakeholders in a focus group like situation and to 
analyse incentive structures and responses. Furthermore, this allows the researchers to observe behaviour in a 
different context than a one-to-one interview, including for example cooperative behavior or peer pressure. We 
plan to use this game table additionally to simulate management measures fishers propose for the future and to 
simulate results. For this the software of the game table has to be further developed and may also be adjusted to 
be used on PCs to make it useable for a wider set of stakeholders outside of the specific game table.  
These four methods will enable us to describe interactions between social and economic issues given ecological 
frame conditions. Two of these issues shall also be those gender and organizational aspects which influence the 
future of the fishing sector. It is fundamental to capture adequately the functioning of incentives in the different IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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geographical areas and fleet segments in order to analyse in a thorough way the links between the objectives set 
and the management measures designed to attain them, as this has been a weak link in the current CFP whose 
solution relies heavily on the quality of participation, an issue belonging to the less researched area of social 
studies that is now specially under need of robust analysis. 
Improved governance and improvement in self- and co-management  
Once  the  objectives  and  incentives  regarding  the  fisheries  policies  have  been  analysed,  the  institutional 
constraints existing or predictable in the European fisheries management framework and their effect upon the 
detected incentive structures and elaborated objectives that constitute the findings of the previous work packages  
will be the next target of analysis. From the management point of view the European Commission makes in its 
Green Paper ([28]) the European Commission makes a number of important suggestions regarding the future 
decentralisation of the CFP as well as the introduction of management structures that encourage the industry to 
take  greater  responsibility  for  the  implementation  of  the  CFP.  In  particular,  the  Commission  believes  that 
decentralization which gives fisher and fishers’ representatives a stronger voice in the policy decision-making 
process  has  the  potential  to  engender  a  culture  of  greater  compliance  with  the  regulatory  requirements 
underpinning the policy.  
Although the link between compliance and participation in management decisions are well documented ([29]; 
[30]), this approach has not been fully exploited so far in the CFP, which continues to implement a top down 
command-control paradigm in the regulation of European fisheries. However, the FP6 COBECOS, led by IoES, 
focused on the potential economic benefits which might accrue from proper enforcement of the management 
measures. Significantly, in the CFP reform debate to date, public servants from  Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Germany and the UK have shown particular interest in remote sensing technologies by means of cameras on 
board vessels with a view to monitoring compliance with regulatory requirements such as the TAC and quota 
regulation.  This  suggests  that  there  is  still  a  strong  leaning  towards  traditional  control  and  enforcement 
approaches in the Member States rather than creating incentive structures facilitating voluntary compliance by 
the industry.  
Another  argument  in  favour  of  improved  governance  is  the  integration  of  fisheries  management  as  a  core 
element in the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy. Strongly related as it is to the environmental pillar of this 
policy, many other instruments such as the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the Habitats Directive will 
continue to have a major influence on the future direction and pace of development of the fishing industry. In 
addition, the competition policy, state-aid rules and the free movement of persons and establishment provisions 
under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as well as the settled case law of the European Court 
of Justice clearly constrain the type of management measures that may be adopted under the CFP. In this context 
more decentralized  management  with  more direct involvement of  fishers  may  facilitate finding solutions to 
regional and local management issues. Without undermining the need for proper control and enforcement, this 
project seeks to further investigate the possibilities of decentralization and inclusion of fishers as a way to deliver 
on the diverse objectives presented by both the CFP and the environmental pillar of the Maritime Policy.  
In addition to the already mentioned multiplicity of policies the Lisbon Treaty has made the decentralization of 
fisheries management a more pressing issue in so far that it has introduced the co-decision procedure for the 
adoption of fisheries legislation apart from the allocation of fishing opportunities ([31]). This will slow down the 
decision-making process in the European institutions. The project will explore how questions of competence, 
subsidiarity, proportionality and delegation under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union can both 
enhance and constrain greater stakeholder participation in fisheries management under the CFP. An interesting 
question is thus the legal and practical limits of decentralization/stakeholder inclusiveness of the CFP. 
The CFP as it is now remains basically a top-down hierarchical system with the Fisheries Council adopting the 
basic regulation, which is then implemented and enforced primarily by the Member States under the auspices of 
the Commission. With the introduction of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) the CFP has taken a major step 
towards the enhancement of the role of stakeholders in the advisory and decision-making process. This however 
only  puts  in  place  an  additional  consultation  mechanism  in  the  system  at  present.  However,  decentralized 
fisheries management systems already exist at a local or regional level in several EU member states which go 
well beyond mere consultation structures. We will analyse, for example, the experience of real co-management 
of the clam fishery in Venice, from which we will have first hand information thanks to the inclusion of the 
cooperative CLODIAMARE as one of the SME partners of the project. In SOCIOEC we seek the analysis of 
such examples on the case study level while also reviewing the CFP in the context of the overall Maritime 
Policy.  In  this  respect,  it  is  highly  relevant  to  look  at  the  possibility  of  taking  the  CFP  from  the  current 
'government  consultation  of  stakeholders'  to  true  'partnership  between  government  and  stakeholders'  in 
management. At this stage we will also broaden the horizon of the analysis by including fisheries management IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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systems outside of the EU with particular emphasis on fisheries in Australia and New Zealand where stronger 
degrees of industry involvement by co- and self-management as well as cost-recovering schemes have been 
successfully implemented.  
In WP 4 the semi-structured interviews with Commission management staff  (DG MARE and DG Environment) 
will  allow  us  to  get  a  broader  understanding  on  how  the  Commission  envisions  the  possibilities  for 
decentralization within the complex set of EU policy frameworks influencing fisheries management. On the case 
study level representatives of broad stakeholders/user groups will be interviewed to investigate what type of co-
management (or indeed self-management) appears most applicable to each of the case studies. 
The risk exists of strong involvement of fishers in the process affecting the performance of the system and 
pushing it in a direction which is questionable from the perspective of the objectives of the CFP and overall 
Maritime Policy. It is, therefore, necessary to include the results of WP 2 in the discussions with stakeholders on 
the regional and local level in evaluating this process. In this way the project gives stakeholders the opportunity 
to be consulted over different stages of the development process of policy inside the life of the same project with 
the scientists getting the chance to obtain feedback on the articulation of fishermen objectives and incentives 
with external incentives and governance structures. Additionally, with the simulation of impacts of management 
measures we will give the stakeholders an insight into the potential consequences of decisions in the context of 
the overall direction of the reformed CFP. 
Impact assessment – methodological improvements 
The analysis of impacts of policy proposals is a legal obligation in the EU, introduced by the European Council 
(Göteborg and Laeken councils in 2001) and part of the Lisbon strategy for jobs and growth. Every proposal for 
new  management  measures/regulations  must  go through  a process of impact assessment (IA)  following the 
overall EU general IA framework (EU impact assessment guidelines of 15 January 2009 ([32])). In this context 
the evaluation in SOCIOEC will also draw on previous experiences with IAs for long term management plans 
already done in the ICES and STECF (e.g. STECF SGMOS reports) building on a methodology developed in a 
long row of previous EU research projects (e.g. EU FP6 RECOVERY and EFIMAS) and following the most 
recent developments on this issue and methodology used there.  
The stakeholder opinion is considered to be a crucial step in the IA according to the EU guidelines. This aspect 
has  also  been  addressed  by  the  STECF  (and  ICES)  subgroups  focusing  on  IA.  In  particular  the  STECF 
subgroups have been asked to develop a standard procedure for stakeholder involvement in the IA analysis by 
using a stepwise approach (scoping, management evaluation, and impact assessment). Using experience from 
this,  the  aim  of  the  project  is  to  take  into  account  the  stakeholders’  opinions  in  a  feedback  loop  and  e.g. 
participatory  evaluation  processes  (as  in  EU  FP6  projects  EFIMAS  and  AFRAME).  Consultation  with 
stakeholders will happen in different phases of the analysis and management scenario evaluations. As far as the 
core of the IA is concerned, the main actors of the sector (from individual fishers to PO representatives, from 
multi-disciplinary fishery scientific experts to fishery managers) will be consulted to identify and evaluate the 
potential social, economic and ecological (stock) effects of the proposed management measures at the case study 
level. Subsequently, after the simulations involved in many of the scenario evaluations have been carried out 
(see below), they will be asked to discuss and give feed-back on results and possible adjustments to the future 
management measures using a cyclic feed-back management evaluation process.  
One technique of analysis that the project will use to take into account stakeholders opinion is the focus group 
([33]; [34]), which is a well known methodology also used in previous EU research projects. The focus group 
approach is a social science technique largely used in qualitative research in which a selected group of people 
representing different stakeholders are asked about their perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes towards a 
product, a service, a concept or specific scenarios of management evaluations. In this project the focus group 
will be used in the IA analysis with different objectives: 
a)  to identify, in a general framework, all the potential social, economic and ecological effects of the 
proposed new policy options using a scenario approach; 
b)  to identify the most important social, economic and ecological potential effects  and assign to them a 
probability and a magnitude with the help of the relevant actors; 
c)  to  discuss  and  draw  some  conclusions  about  non  quantifiable  impacts  (mainly  relating  to  social 
aspects); 
d)  to discuss inputs and results to/from the quantitative  simulation phase in a participatory  modelling 
approach constituted by cyclic feedback loop process, as described below. 
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The above qualitative analyses will be integrated with quantitative analyses to infer on the ecological and socio-
economic impacts. The aim of the quantitative analysis will be to develop projections based on the scenarios 
defined within each case study. 
The impacts of the new (proposed) management measures will be measured based on a set of indicators (social, 
economic  and  ecological;  see  e.g.  the  EU  FP6  IMAGE  project)  that  will  be  defined  in  relation  to  specific 
objectives set and defined in WP2 for the selected fisheries, industry and stocks.
8 The indicators used according 
to objectives will consist of state indicators (e.g. fleet capacity, value added, employment, stock biomass, etc.), 
and  pressure  or  impact  indicators  (regulations,  world  market  prices,  environment,  fishing  mortality, 
technological efficiency increase and creeping, etc.) and will be measured against reference points or levels for 
these indicators. The most recent advance on this issue (including STECF working groups, DG MARE CFP 
impacts studies and EU Research Projects, as EU FP6 IMAGE, will be taken into account in defining the list of 
the most appropriate state and pressure (impact) indicators. In addition, RACs will be directly involved to define 
and discuss descriptors especially on the social impacts (as for example the dependency of local communities on 
the fishery or the acceptability of multi-annual management plans). 
The SOCIOEC consortium will be using a range of existing bio-economic models to evaluate through stochastic 
simulations, the future impact on the natural resources and human benefit of current and alternative management 
measures, options and strategies based on the different indicators and descriptors identified above (see e.g. [35]; 
EU Lot5 Tender on Review of Bio-Economic Models, EU FP6 projects EFIMAS and FP 7 ECOKNOWS).  
Alternatively,  some  of  these  models  could  be  used  in  an  optimization  or  maximization  fashion  to  evaluate 
optimal management in relation to stocks, fisheries and industry (bio-economic optimization models) as in the 
mentioned EU projects EFIMAS and ECOKNOWS. 
Some of these bio-economic models are spatially and seasonally explicit and are as such particularly suited to 
evaluate the spatial effects of management, as ws requested in the EU call to which SOCIOEC belongs. These 
include e.g. the ISIS-Fish modeling platform ([36]; [37]), and the extensive spatial FLR model ([38]) which can 
integrate detailed knowledge on high resolution information on catch and effort by use of developed advanced 
methods on coupling of VMS and Logbook data (see the EU Lot2 Coupling of Logbook and VMS Data; [39]), 
which will here respectively be applied to the Western Waters and Baltic Sea fisheries. These latter tools are 
multi-stock and multi-fleet based covering important EU international métiers and fisheries and can as such deal 
with mixed fisheries aspects which also include the FL-Cube-model used for advanced HCR evaluation in mixed 
fisheries ([40]; [41]) and evaluation of Long Term Management Plans (e.g. [42]).  Using the spatial explicit 
models  will  enable  the  evaluation  of  socio-economic  and  spatial  effects  of  the  management  measures  with 
special attention to fishers' behavioural responses to the range of management measures (e.g. incentives) and to 
the potential links of management measures with the uncertainties and external factors included (e.g. oil price, 
interest rates, fish market price variations). In relation to energy use in the fishery and other related factors 
individual  based  models  (IBM)  with  high  spatial  and  temporal  resolution  of  catch  and  effort  have  been 
developed for the Danish and Dutch fishing vessels  (e.g. [43]). 
Other models are specifically designed to estimate the likely effects of management measures primarily based on 
effort restrictions in the short and medium term. As an example, the BIRDMOD model ([44]) is a multi-species 
and  multi-fleet  simulation  model  specifically  developed  to  simulate  the  main  management  measures  (effort 
restrictions and technical measures on selectivity) applied in the Mediterranean Sea. Simulations are conducted 
step-by-step at regular time intervals through the period defined for prediction. In this sense, BIRDMOD is a 
dynamic  model.  The  model  is  organized  in  a  biological  and  an  economic  module.  The  biological  module 
simulates the evolution of the biomass and the fishing mortality for each of the target species included in the 
model. Based on biomass and fishing mortality, landings are estimated by species and fleet segment. Given the 
level of landings and assumptions on price and costs dynamics, the economic module simulates the evolution of 
a number of economic and social variables providing an assessment of the status of the fisheries from a socio-
economic point of view. The model output consists of the historical series simulated for the biological and socio-
economic  variables  included  in  the  logical-conceptual  pattern  of  the  model.  As  the  BIRDMOD  biological 
component is very data demanding, new versions of the model have been recently developed to simulate the 
effects of management measures on fisheries where biological data are poor. 
For those (quantifiable) indicators whose full magnitude cannot be projected by means of bio-economic models 
(e.g. management costs, dynamics of fisheries costs, etc.), alternative quantitative estimation techniques will be 
applied, e.g. extrapolation based on previously derived coefficients through statistical inference on the basis of 
similar impacts and occurrences elsewhere. 
For a good quality impact assessment any model development and ex-ante evaluation should take care of the role 
that externalities and uncertainties can play in determining final impacts (see e.g. review in [45]). This aspect 
will be taken into account by carrying out uncertainty assessments and sensitivity analyses through scenario 
modeling involved in risk assessment within the simulation or optimization phase described above. This helps us IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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to evaluate the robustness of alternatives for each of the processes involved herein as well as to estimate rates of 
changes or identify switching points. The sensitivity analysis and the participatory modeling approaches will be 
crucial in the identification of the preferable option in achieving the specific objectives defined in collaboration 
with stakeholders in WP2. If different policy options are proposed in order to achieve the specific objectives 
defined at case study level, an evaluation of the most appropriate option will be carried out by comparing options 
on the base of the general evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence.  
The simulations according to ecological, economic and social indicators and their relative performance and 
results in relation to reference points for those indicators will give a direct efficiency evaluation according to the 
assessed uncertainty and sensitivity at the lovel of fishery, industry, stock, etc.  The basic instrument to evaluate 
the economic effectiveness with respect to e.g. optimization is the Cost Benefit (CB) or Cost-Effectiveness 
analysis ((OECD [32]). The CB analysis is generally used when the most significant part of both costs and 
benefits can be quantified. An option is considered to be justified when it promises the greatest net benefits (total 
benefits-total costs). On the other hand, the CE analysis (see above) is generally used as an alternative to cost-
benefit analysis in cases where it is difficult to value benefits in monetary terms. It requires calculating the cost 
needed to achieve the objectives, and then comparing the costs of the different proposed options. Alternatively, 
uncertainty analysis can be carried out using optimal experimental designs derived from statistical models ([46]). 
Management  strategies  that  are  robust  to  uncertainties  may  then  be  identified  ([47],  [48]).  Additionally, 
information gap-theory ([49]) provides another method for evaluating the robustness of model-based decisions. 
In this way, SOCIOEC closes the cycle of analyzing a management measure right from its inception as a tool to 
achieve  an  objective  until  the  prediction  of  its  overall  consequences,  following  the  whole  process  with  an 
emphasis on incentives and governance (participation)  in an exercise that aims at filling a gap identified by the 
process of revision of the current CFP. 
First results: economic sustainability to clarify one of the overarching principles 
In a joint workshop with another European FP 7 project (MYFISH) for defining medium and long term 
objectives of fisheries policy a focus group to define economic sustainability was assembled. Participants were 
scientists, stakeholders, RAC representatives and regional managers. In the discussion it became obvious that 
there is a need  to distinguish between the level of society (owner of the resource) and that of the individual 
fishermen (company). On a societal level the following objectives were discussed: 
·  Rent/MEY: What is beyond normal profits (explained later) we call Rent. The rent and profits depend 
on many variables managers and fishermen are not able to control like market prices.  
·  Value chain: whole value chain of a fishery, the challenge being to optimize every part of it. The 
indicator for that may be Gross Value Added (GVA) also including the fish processing and auxiliary 
industry.  
·  Utility: In economics we often talk about maximizing utility. This utility we then also measure in 
money units. In case of fisheries we can also think about maximizing utility by taking also other parts of 
utility into account and valuing it (e.g. ecosystem services, amenity values). This is also an issue when 
comparing societal interests and the interest of an individual fisherman (Gross Value Added in the 
interest of society, profit/making a living in the interest of an individual or small scale fisherman).  
In Australia, one of the cases where SOCIOEC focuses in order to find contributions for management measures 
beyond the current local experiences in the EU, MEY is the agreed target for fisheries management. Therefore, 
this could seem to be the first candidate objective for the CFP as for biological sustainability MSY has been 
decided.  However, it is necessary to define how to measure MEY. The group was not able to go deep into detail 
about such a definition but rent defined as ‘earnings beyond normal profits’ seemed to be a reasonable candidate. 
Several participants expressed their support for a broader definition of economic sustainability. Possible 
candidates are GVA for the whole value chain or overall utility generated by the fishing sector. In this case it 
was also not possible to go more into detail but from the perspective of data availability GVA for the whole 
value chain seems a possible objective/target. Overall utility would also include e.g. negative external effects of 
fishing on ecosystems/non-target species and would require a much more comprehensive cost-benefit estimation 
which seems unachievable at the moment.  
The group then also discussed possible objectives/targets and indicators for the company level: IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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·  GVA: In this case on a company level as defined in the Annual Economic Report (AER) of the STECF 
·  Profit: This is the typical maximization target on a company level. The owner of the company (or in 
most cases individual fishermen) will try to have at least a ‘normal profit’ of zero as then all costs 
(including capital costs and some kind of personal payment for the owner) are paid. This means rent on 
a company level.  
As more data is available on company level it seems possible to calculate GVA and profits and set 
objectives/targets for them. It was, however, not possible to discuss how this may look like in the practice of 
fisheries management. It may be reasonable to argue that profitable companies are the backbone of a sustainable 
exploitation of resources. Nevertheless, the well-being of individual shareholders or company owners does not 
seem to be the objective of fisheries management even assuming that a profitable fishing sector benefits society 
overall. In the discussions in the regional focus groups of the case study areas the project partner will discuss this 
issue further to see how far the stakeholder want to go in looking on individual companies.  
Summary and Outlook 
The EU FP 7 project SOCIOEC is the only fisheries project at the moment with a clear socio-economic focus. It 
begun March 1
st with a duration of three years. The project addresses the following main research questions: 
overall objectives of the CFP, incentive structure of management measures, better governance and integration of 
stakeholders and improvement of methods for socio-economic impact assessment. The specificity of the project 
lies on its framework of analysis (objectives-incentives-governance-impact) and the possibility to pretest it in an 
integrated way with a set of case studies that at the same time approach the main issues in the coming CFP and 
are designed to be compatible with the latest developments in the current CFP, e.g. the Regional Advisory 
Councils. This framework would allow for example to test how different stake holders view a switch between 
MSY, GVA or MEY as objectives, and give a toolbox to managers that allows them to have an integral 
perspective on the impact of management measures.  
As the CFP reform is under way but the new regulation not adopted yet adjustments in the research agenda may 
be necessary. The discard ban, for example, will probably be introduced via a fishery instead of a species 
approach. Additionally, it is unclear if Transferable Fishing Concessions will be mandatory in the member states 
or not. Therefore, the specific research agenda can be adjusted. The next steps will be interviews and focus group 
discussion on objective/targets on a regional level and incentive structures in existing management measures.  
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Endnotes 
1 The research project is receiving funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme 
(FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 289192. 
2 Ott & Döring ([4]) distinguish between six categories: man-made capital, natural capital, cultivated natural 
capital (like farmland), social capital, knowledge capital, and human capital. 
3 A tax imposed to every kg of fish landed above quota allowance. This tax is currently implemented to manage 
New Zealand fisheries (one of the non-EU fisheries being investigated), where it is referred to as the deemed 
value. 
4 Referred to as the deemed value in New Zealand 
5 Mixing of western and eastern cod stocks 
6 Icelandic fisheries 
7 With regard to this issue WP 3 and 4 will work closely together. 
8 It is obvious that in cases where useable we draw on biological/ecological indicators which are already defined 
in the CFP or other regulations (MSFD) like the objective to reach MSY by 2015. 